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 In the United Kingdom and many other European countries, every child receives a 
cash benefit.  Eligibility for the benefit, as well as the benefit amount, is determined 
without regard to the parents’ income or asset holdings or marital status.  As automated 
data systems become more sophisticated and unique identifiers (e.g., the social security 
number in the United States) become more prevalent, universal benefits could be as easy 
to distribute as voter registration or library cards.1   
 However, policymakers have other goals in addition to making the job of program 
administrators easier. These goals may include removing families from poverty, 
                                                 
∗  Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury. 
∗ Views and opinions in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the policies or 
positions of the Treasury Department. 
1   Even with universal benefits, there will be problems for administrators to sort through.  Keeping 
accurate and timely records on births and deaths is one hurdle.  Administrators may also have to settle 
competing claims when more than one “guardian” claims benefits on behalf of a minor child or disabled 
adult. 
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encouraging work, and restraining budgetary costs.  In the United States, the earned 
income tax credit (EITC) was expanded in 1993 both to make work pay and to lift more 
full-time minimum wage workers out of poverty.   To achieve this goal, the maximum 
credit rate for families with two or more children was increased from 25 percent to 40 
percent of earnings and the maximum credit was increased by nearly $1,400.  Eligibility 
for the maximum credit rate was limited to families with incomes below $8,425, and 
families with incomes above $27,000 were ineligible for any credit.2   Achieving certain 
other goals of the 1993 legislation – namely deficit reduction – would not have been 
possible had similar size benefits been provided to all families.      
 Thus, policymakers – in the United States, but also increasingly in the United 
Kingdom – rely on targeting to provide benefits to the neediest families without breaking 
the bank.  But targeting can also increase compliance burdens for applicants and 
administrative costs.  Targeting also may require trade-offs with other tax and social 
policy goals.  
 Distinguishing among families based on differences in ability to pay can achieve 
horizontal equity goals, but codifying these distinctions may be difficult and result in 
confusing laws.  Taxpayers (and administrators, as well) may be confused by subtle 
distinctions, leading to unintentional errors.  Phasing out benefits to provide assistance to 
those with the greatest need may achieve vertical equity goals, but can also result in high 
marginal tax rates and marriage penalties.  High marginal tax rates and marriage penalties 
may adversely affect labor supply and family formation decisions.  They may also 
encourage applicants to misreport income and family status (such as number of children 
and filing status) to obtain more benefits. 
 Short of eliminating targeting, policymakers can strive to make the eligibility 
rules simple to understand and easy to administer.  But simplification may go only so far.   
If policymakers choose to target benefits, then they must address the question of which 
government agency can best reach out to the targeted population and administer the 
program well.    
 In several earlier papers (Holtzblatt, 2000; Holtzblatt and McCubbin, 2004), I 
have suggested that in the United States assistance to at least some low-income 
                                                 
2  1996 law in 1994 dollars. 
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individuals can best be done through the individual income tax system.  In particular, 
there are three features of the U.S. tax-transfer system that favor this approach.  First, the 
income tax already collects information on income and family characteristics, which may 
also be used to target benefits.  Little or no additional information may be required for a 
targeted benefit.  Second, many low-income workers file tax returns, even if they owe no 
income taxes.  Third, many low-income workers do not receive federally-funded 
assistance from other government agencies, such as state welfare offices.  Providing 
assistance through the tax system may be the most effective method of reaching the 
working poor. 
 These arguments, however, do not necessarily extend to other countries and other 
tax systems.  For example, the unit of taxation in the United Kingdom is the individual, 
so the tax authorities know little about a family’s composition or well-being.  Second, the 
United Kingdom has an exact withholding tax system, in which about two-thirds of 
taxpayers are exempted from filing returns.  In addition, the United Kingdom has a 
universal child benefit that every parent is entitled to receive.  The child benefit has – 
until recently – been administered by the U.K.’s Department of Social Security.  These 
factors would seem to suggest that the United Kingdom should rely on the transfer 
system to provide further assistance to low-income families. 
 Yet, the last decade has seen an explosion of tax credits in the United Kingdom.  
Tax credits have been created for families with children, low-income workers, disabled 
individuals, and older reentrants into the labor market.   The British experience 
demonstrates that there can be other administrative and political reasons for using the tax 
system to deliver targeted benefits.   
 
Part I:  U.S. Tax-Transfer System 
 
Benefits of Using Income Tax System to Deliver Targeted Benefits 
 Over the past two decades, the income tax threshold in the United States has 
gradually risen.   Expansions of child-related tax benefits have increased the income tax 
threshold for families with children to roughly twice the poverty level.  For unmarried 
individuals without children, the income tax thresholds have also increased over the 
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poverty level but at a much slower pace.  In 2004, a single filer with no children is 
exempted from income tax if his or her income is less than 119 percent of poverty.  
 Because many low-income families are exempt from income taxation, the income 
tax system might not seem the obvious way to provide them with additional assistance.  
However, there are several other factors to consider.  First, the U.S. income tax system 
already collects information that be used to distinguish among families based on ability-
to-pay criteria.  Second, the tax system requires many individuals to file even if they do 
not have an income tax liability.  Third, many low-income filers have little or no contact 
with other government agencies.  For them, the point of contact with the federal 
government is the tax system.    
 Assistance to low-income families can be provided through refundable tax credits, 
which entitle recipients to the full amount of the credit even if they have little or no 
income tax liability.  (The amount payable in excess of income tax liability is scored as 
an outlay in the federal budget accounts.)  Currently, in the United States, there are three 
refundable tax credits:  the EITC, the refundable portion of the child tax credit (known as 
the “additional child tax credit”), and the health coverage tax credit.  To be eligible for 
the first two credits, an individual must have earned income.  The newer health coverage 
credit is available only to certain dislocated workers3 and, as Table 1 demonstrates, is a 
very small program relative to the other two refundable tax credits.   
 Distinguishing among families.  In the U.S. income tax, the unit of taxation is the 
individual or, if married, the couple.  The definition of income is fairly broad, although 
means-tested government benefits and certain interest income are exempt from taxation.  
The income tax adjusts for ability-to-pay based, in part, on family composition, with the 
taxpayer receiving additional exemptions for children and other dependents and if he or 
she is elderly or blind.  In addition, taxpayers are eligible for a standard deduction, which 
size varies based on marital status or, if unmarried, the care of children and other 
dependents. 
                                                 
3  Eligible individuals include people who receive a Trade Readjustment Allowance (TRA), workers who 
are 50 or older and who receive a certain percentage of the wage differential between the wages of their 
previous, adversely-affected employment and their new full-time employment, and pension benefit 
recipients of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).  
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 As a result, taxpayers already provide information on the first page of the tax 
return that would also be required to target benefits to families.  Taxpayer-reported 
information is supplemented by independent information reports about individuals’ 
income – from wages to interest and dividends – from third-party payers.  Third-party 
information provides a check on taxpayers’ reports and also includes data on people who 
do not file returns.  The IRS receives more than one billion information returns, including 
several hundred million wage reports, each year (U.S. Treasury Department, 2003).  
 What has been missing from IRS data files – until recently – has been 
independent data on family relationships.  Although the tax system differentiates between 
taxpayers based on marital status (joint filing), living arrangements (head of household 
filing status), and family composition (dependents), the IRS did not systemically verify 
these requirements for many years outside of an audit environment.  This has been 
gradually changing since 1986 and has been partly driven by efforts to improve the 
administration of refundable tax credits.  
 The first step in this effort was a requirement in the 1986 Tax Reform Act that 
taxpayers report a unique identifier (typically, the social security number) for each child 
over five claimed as a dependent or EITC qualifying child.  While this effort was 
motivated by IRS reports that the number of claimed dependents exceeded reasonable 
expectations, subsequent efforts were driven by concerns about administering the EITC.  
Within a decade, a social security number was required for every dependent from birth.  
In 1996, the IRS was authorized to use expeditious processes to deny both dependency 
exemptions and the EITC unless taxpayers provided valid social security numbers.  Once 
the IRS could validate social security numbers upfront during processing, the agency 
began to mount an effort to check for duplicate claims of EITC qualifying children as 
well as dependent exemptions. 
 In 1997, the IRS gained obtained access to two new data files that can be linked to 
IRS files through social security numbers.  The first file is the Federal Case Registry of 
Child Support Orders (FCR) that contains information on custodial arrangements for 
children whose parents are divorced or separated.  The FCR is maintained by the Office 
of Child Support Enforcement in the Department of Health and Human Services.  The 
second is Kidlink, a Social Security Administration file linking the names and social 
International Studies Program Public Finance Conference 
The Challenges of Tax Reform in a Global Economy 
6 
security numbers of children and their parents.  Together, these two data files allow the 
IRS to check for questionable claims of provisions based on a child’s source of support, 
living arrangements, and relationships. 
 Currently, the IRS is using both files in a limited manner.  The Treasury 
Department is currently evaluating the quality of information provided by states for tax 
enforcement purposes.  Kidlink contains information for children who received social 
security numbers since 1998, meaning that the file will not contain information on a 
complete cohort of potential child dependents and EITC qualifying children for at least 
another decade.  Still, the files contain sufficient information to be used to help select 
returns for audits and other enforcement activities.   
 Independent information on filing status is still scanty.  Many states and localities 
do not have automated registries of marriages and divorce, making it impossible at this 
time for the IRS to obtain access to data on marital status. The IRS is currently testing 
various commercial data sets that contain information on the names of individuals 
cohabiting in the same residence.  This test is being done in conjunction with an EITC 
compliance initiative to determine if such data can be useful in detecting questionable 
claims of marital status. 
 Most of the family-related activities are aimed at questionable EITC claims, but 
the IRS has the authority to use this information for non-EITC issues as well, including 
claims of dependency exemptions and filing status. A key lesson from the past decade is 
that the inclusion of the family-related credits in the IRS creates synergy.  Just as the 
income related information reported to the IRS helps in the administration of the targeted 
benefits, the administration of refundable tax credits has made the IRS seek out data that 
may have broader consequences for tax administration.  
 Filing Requirements.   Individuals are required to file a tax return when their 
gross income equals or exceeds the sum of the taxpayer’s personal exemption and the 
standard deduction (the “filing threshold”).  Single individuals without children generally 
incur income tax liabilities when their gross income exceeds the filing threshold.  Thus, it 
is unlikely that such individuals would be required to file a tax return unless they owe 
income taxes.  But if, for example, they have dependents, then they are required to file 
returns even when they have no positive income tax liability.   In effect, they must file 
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returns to identify the dependents who, by making them eligible for dependent 
exemptions and certain tax credits, also wipe out their income tax liability. 
 As Figure 1 demonstrates, the gap between the filing and income tax thresholds 
has widened, particularly for families with children, in recent years.  By 2004, a married 
couple with two children did not incur any tax liability until their income exceeded 198 
percent of poverty.  However, they were required to file a tax return with income about 
84 percent of poverty.   Beginning in 1994, the gap between filing and tax thresholds also 
increased for childless workers, as a result of an extension of a small EITC to very low-
income childless workers.  In 2004, they are required to file a return when their income is 
about 98 percent of poverty and pay taxes when their income is about 119 percent of 
poverty. 
 As Table 2 shows, nearly 90 percent of filers are required to file a tax return.  
Most of the remainder file to obtain refunds of income taxes that were overwithheld 
during the year.  This is true even of low-income filers.  Among taxpayers with adjusted 
gross income below $30,000, about 79 percent are required to file a tax return and an 
additional 16 percent file to obtain refunds of overwithheld income taxes.  (And among 
those who file to claim either the EITC or the additional child tax credit, nearly 96 
percent are required to file.)  Less than 2 percent file solely to obtain refundable tax 
credits. 
Point of Contact.  Many low-income individuals who have contact with the 
income tax system do not appear to have regular interactions with other government 
agencies.  Because they are able-bodied and work, they may not be eligible for some 
forms of assistance such as supplemental security income (SSI).  Income and asset tests 
may limit assistance to the most needy individuals and families.  For example, a 
household with income above 133 percent of poverty and $2,000 of assets is not eligible 
for assistance.     
Even if they meet the eligibility criteria, many low-income individuals – 
particularly the working poor – do not the claim the benefits to which they are entitled.  
Only about 52 percent of eligible households claimed food stamps in 2001.  Among 
eligible households with earnings, the food stamp participation rate was 44 percent 
(Cunnyngham, 2003).    Applying for food stamp benefits imposes significant compliance 
International Studies Program Public Finance Conference 
The Challenges of Tax Reform in a Global Economy 
8 
burdens on individuals, particularly the working poor who often must take time off from 
work to apply for benefits in-person.  (see Ponza, 1999; GAO, 1999)  Some low-income 
individuals may steer away from applying for certain types of low-income assistance due 
to stigma concerns.  
Thus, it is not surprising to find that relatively few filing units eligible for the 
EITC report receiving cash transfers.  Among low-income workers eligible for the EITC 
in 2000, only about one in four reported claiming one of the major low-income benefits 
administered by state welfare agencies or the Social Security Administration in 2000.  
(See Table 3.) 
 
Drawbacks of using the tax system to deliver targeted benefits    
 As the preceding discussion suggests, there are compelling arguments as to why 
the tax system can be used to provide benefits to low-income individuals.  But there also 
are reasons why the tax system may not be the best approach.  First, the annual 
accounting framework of the tax system makes it difficult to time payments to coincide 
with a family’s needs.  Second, the U.S. income tax is a self-assessment system, meaning 
that taxpayers and credit applicants alike are often either on their own when completing 
tax returns or paying others to help them.  Third, the IRS has many responsibilities and 
must balance many priorities.  The danger is two-sided:  a slight nudge in either direction 
can disturb this delicate balancing act, causing the IRS to devote too many or too few 
resources to the task of administering refundable tax credits.  
 Timing.  In the U.S. tax system, income is measured on an annual basis, and 
returns are filed at the end of the tax year.  An annual accounting system, combined with 
end-of-year reconciliation, has two consequences for providing targeted benefits.  First, 
an individual may be eligible for assistance based on annual income even though his or 
her current monthly income is relatively high.  Second, it is difficult to time receipt of 
benefits to coincide with the taxpayer’s need.  Taxpayers typically do not receive their 
tax credits until they file returns at the end of the year. 
 While it is difficult to change the annual accounting system, there have been at 
least two attempts to accelerate payments of credits.  Since 1978, EITC claimants have 
had the option of requesting advance payments of the EITC from their employers 
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throughout the year.  (Neither the self-employed nor childless individuals can avail 
themselves of this option.)  Employers offset the costs of the advance payments by 
reducing their payments of withheld income and employment taxes and notify the IRS of 
individuals’ receipts of advance payments at the end of the tax year. At the end of the 
year, credit claimants must reconcile advance payments received during the year with the 
amount of credit for which they were actually eligible.  If they receive too little, they can 
receive the remaining amount when they file their tax return at the end of the year; 
conversely, if they receive too much, they must repay the overpayment with their tax 
return.     
 While the advance payment option provides a mechanism to receive payments on 
a timely basis, only a small number of EITC claimants have ever claimed the credit in 
advance.  During tax year 2002, 130,924 taxpayers – less than one percent of EITC 
claimants with children – claimed the EITC in advance.  The reasons for the low 
utilization rate are not fully known.  One popular explanation is that workers simply do not 
know that they have the option of claiming the credit in advance.  A General Accounting 
Office study (1992) provided some support for this theory when investigators found 
widespread ignorance about the advance payment option among low-income workers.  To 
remedy ignorance, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 required that the IRS to 
test the effectiveness of sending notices to EITC claimants, informing them about the 
advance payment option.  The IRS (1999) found that notices increased participation in the 
advance payment option by a statistically significant, but small, amount.       
 There may be other barriers to participation in the advance payment option.  The 
GAO study also found that once informed, many workers stated that they would prefer to 
receive the EITC in a lump-sum payment.  While some workers might simply prefer the 
forced savings provided by receipt of a lump-sum payment at the end of the year, others 
may not claim the EITC in advance for fear of being forced to repay a sizable overpayment 
at the end of the year if their income or family status changes during the course of the year.  
(To limit the risk of overpayments, Congress constrained the advance payment to 60 
percent of the maximum credit for which a worker with one child would be entitled in 
1993.)  Workers might also be reluctant to ask their employers for advanced payments of 
the EITC.               
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 Another mechanism to accelerate the payment of credits was used in 2001 and 
again in 2003, but in neither year was this mechanism applied specifically to target relief 
to low-income families in a more timely fashion.   Instead, the motivation behind 
advancing payments of the rate reduction credit in 2001 and the child tax credit 
(including the refundable portion) in 2003 was economic stimulation.  Thus when the 
child tax credit was increased by $400 for tax year 2003 in the Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act, policymakers also wanted taxpayers to begin spending their 
tax cuts as quickly as possible.  The tax act was enacted in May, and taxpayers began to 
receive checks for the increase in the child tax credit within two months.  Eligibility for 
the advance payments was based on income and family characteristics as reported on the 
taxpayer’s 2002 tax return.  If there was a change in filing status or income during 2003 
that was in the taxpayer’s favor, he or she could claim the remaining amount when they 
filed their 2003 tax returns.  However, unlike the EITC advance payments, taxpayers 
were not required to repay overpayments of the advance credits if the change in 
circumstances was not in their favor.  Neither the advance payments of the rate reduction 
credits or the child tax credits were done on a permanent basis. 
 Given the difficulties in accelerating payments without risking overpayments, one 
should ask whether concern with timeliness of payments (for reasons other than 
economic simulation) is misplaced and possibly paternalistic.  Three different types of 
studies find evidence that low-income working families do not rely on the lump-sum 
EITC payment solely for current consumption.  Surveying a sample of individuals 
claiming the EITC in free tax preparation clinics in Chicago, Smeeding et al (2001) find 
that they plan to use the credit for savings, car purchases, tuition payments, and moving 
expenses.  Using the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Barrow and McGranahan (2001) 
find that consumption rises, particularly for durable goods, in the months in which EITC 
refunds are received.  Based on interviews of credit claimants in an ethnographic study of 
the New Hope Project in Milwaukee, Romich and Weisner (2001) conclude that families 
view lump-sum payments of the EITC as a form of forced savings. These studies would 
support a view that low-income working families are able to smooth consumption over 
the year to account for the receipt of large lump-sum payments.  
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 Self-assessment System.  The tax system relies on self-assessment, which means 
that filers either prepare their own returns (sometimes with the help of special software 
packages) or they pay others to help them.  Taxpayers may also turn to IRS assistance 
centers or IRS-sponsored volunteer sites for help with tax returns, but the limited 
availability of free assistance locations can mean long lines and long waits for such 
services.  
 Low-income filers face two hurdles in dealing with a self-assessment system.  
First, they are often poorly educated.  Among filers with incomes below 200 percent of 
poverty, more than a quarter lack a high school diploma (Holtzblatt and McCubbin, 
2004).  For many, English is not their native tongue.  Nearly 20 percent were born in 
countries where English was neither the official or primary language (Holtzblatt and 
McCubbin, 2004).  While a few forms and publications are available in Spanish, most are 
available only in English. 
 A second hurdle is the complexity of the eligibility rules used to target assistance.   
As I (together with Janet McCubbin) have detailed in earlier papers (2003, 2004), the 
rules governing programs for low-income filers are complicated, sometimes mirroring the 
complexity in claimants’ lives.  For example, the additional child tax credit requires proof 
that the taxpayer provided most of a child’s support.  However, proving support requires 
retention of receipts throughout the year on shelter, food, clothing, child care, education, 
etc.  It may be particularly difficult for taxpayers to demonstrate (or prove) compliance 
with this test when the taxpayer receives outside support from the government or others 
in addition to his own earnings.  The EITC requires proof that the taxpayer lived with her 
child for over half the year, but parents who share custody of a child may be hard pressed 
to prove with whom the child resided for 188 days.    
 Further adding to the confusion is the fact that taxpayer may be eligible for both 
the EITC and the additional child tax credit, but the credits’ eligibility criteria – while 
similar – differ in subtle ways.  In 2005, an estimated 22 million taxpayers – including 16 
million filers with children – will claim the EITC.  Eleven million filers are estimated to 
receive the additional child tax credit.  Not surprisingly, there is significant overlap 
between these two populations – with about 8 million (or 75 percent of additional child 
tax credit claimants) expected to claim both credits.  Yet, as Table 4 demonstrates, each 
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credit uses somewhat different rules to target income and family size and composition.  
Tax experts, themselves, are challenged at trying to explain the difference in the two 
credits’ definitions of earned income. 4  
 The educational deficiencies of credit recipients, combined with the complexity of 
the credits’ rules, may contribute to the increasing number of EITC claimants who are 
turning to paid preparers.  In 2000, about 53 percent of all taxpayers used paid preparers.  
Use of paid preparers was higher among EITC claimants, with about 64 percent paying 
someone else to prepare their return.5  But it is also possible that EITC claimants turned 
to preparers for other reasons.  They may turn to paid preparers to file electronically, 
which enables them to receive refunds more quickly.  Refundable tax credits have 
increased substantially in recent years, and recipients may be trading off income for more 
leisure.   
 Conflicting Priorities in the IRS.  To state the obvious, administering low-income 
benefits is not the sole task of the IRS.  The IRS is responsible for administrating both 
individual and corporate income taxes, the estate tax (while it continues), and various 
excise taxes.  It also has a role in the administration of pensions and tax-exempt agencies.  
The IRS processes over 135 million individual and corporate income tax returns a year as 
well as over a billion information returns from employers and other third-parties.  In total, 
the IRS collects roughly a trillion dollars in taxes each year, while it pays out about $40 
billion in refundable credits annually.  To achieve these tasks, the IRS receives a budget 
of nearly $10 billion – of which less than $200 to $300 million is devoted to 
administering refundable tax credits.   
 Within its $10 billion budget, the IRS must balance all of these competing 
priorities.  On the one hand, the relative size of refundable tax credits subject to rest of 
plate means other issues may (and perhaps) should dominate.  On the other hand, political 
sensitivities surrounding refundable tax credits can sometimes give more weight to its 
concerns.  In the past decade, the IRS has conducted four EITC compliance studies but 
                                                 
4 Both credits define earned income to include only taxable compensation.  But the additional child tax 
credit further restricts earned income to compensation included in taxable income.  For example, some 
ministers add parsonage allowances to self-employment income when computing self-employment income 
taxes and the EITC.  However, such allowances are excluded from taxable income for purposes of the 
regular income tax and the additional child tax credit.  
 
5  Unpublished IRS data. 
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no comparable studies were done on other provisions in the income tax system – a 
problem that will be remedied soon with the completion of the National Research 
Program, a comprehensive study of compliance among individual income taxpayers in 
2001.  The downside of four EITC compliance studies, with none of other tax provisions, 
is a pervasive view that the credit is the IRS’s largest compliance problem.  Evidence of 
this concern is the higher audit rate for EITC claimants than for all taxpayers (Holtzblatt 
and McCubbin, 2004) and the fact that the Administration’s FY 2005 Budget contains 
three separate performance goals (one still to be determined) for the EITC out of a total 
of 54 goals for the entire IRS (OMB, 2004).  Until more comprehensive compliance data 
become available, one cannot judge if this emphasis is too much or too little. 
 
How well do refundable tax credits do in meeting their goals?  
 In deciding between refundable tax credits and other approaches, clearly an 
important consideration is how well the former do in achieving policy and administrative 
goals.  Much of the evidence to date is about the EITC, which is not surprising since it 
has been in existence far longer than the other refundable credits. 
 There is some evidence to support the view that the EITC achieves its policy 
objectives.  In 2002, the EITC lifted 4.6 people out of poverty, including 2.5 million 
children under the age of 18.6   Several recent studies have found that the EITC 
encourages work.  Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) found that more than 60 percent of a 
nine percentage point increase in the employment of single mothers between 1984 and 
1986 was due to expansions of the EITC.  Dickert, Houser, and Scholz (1995) estimated 
that expansions of the EITC between 1993 and 1996 would induce more than half a 
million families to move from welfare to work.  A study by Eissa and Liebman (1996) 
found that the EITC significantly increases labor force participation among single 
mothers, especially less educated women.   
 The story is more mixed on the administrative side.  The good news is that most 
people who are eligible for the EITC claim the credit.  Between 75 and 86 percent of 
those eligible for the EITC claim the credit (Scholz, 1994, GAO, 2001, Treasury, 2002b).  
As noted earlier, participation rates for the food stamp program, particularly among the 
                                                 
6  Authors’ computations based on Census data (www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/poverty02/r&dtable5.html). 
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working poor, are notably lower.  On the other hand, noncompliance among EITC 
claimants is high.  A study conducted by the IRS of compliance among EITC claimants 
in tax year 1999 found that between $9.7 billion and $11.1 billion of EITC claims were 
erroneous.7   IRS enforcement activities prevented or recovered about $1.2 billion in 
erroneous claims.  Thus, between $8.5 and $9.9 billion in EITC claims – or between 27.0 
and 31.7 percent of total EITC claims – was erroneously paid to taxpayers for tax year 
1999 (Treasury, 2002a).8   
 As Table 5 shows, errors are primarily associated with the targeting criteria that 
are difficult for the IRS to verify.  The largest source of EITC errors in 1999 was the 
failure to claim a child who met the qualifications for the credit.  Typically, taxpayers 
failed to demonstrate that they resided with a qualifying child for the required amount of 
time.   Many taxpayers also misstated their relationship to the child claimed for the EITC 
at the same time that they misreported how long the child resided with them.      
 Misreporting of filing status was the second largest source of errors.  Many 
taxpayers claimed to be single or head-of-household filers when they were, in fact, still 
legally married and required to file either jointly with their spouse or “married filing 
separately.”  About $2.1 billion in EITC overclaims was attributable to cases where the 
taxpayers filing status was changed to married filing separately, either alone or in 
combination with other errors.  In addition, over $600 million in overclaims was 
attributable to couples who should have filed joint returns.  In these cases, the EITC was 
reduced or eliminated when the income of the two spouses was combined.   
                                                 
7 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, February 28, 2002b.  The study was 
based on audits of 3,457 randomly selected tax year 1999 returns filed during 2000 and claiming the EITC.  
The sample represents a population of 18.8 million tax returns and about $31.3 billion in EITC claims.  The 
EITC errors identified in the study include both intentional noncompliance and unintentional reporting 
mistakes, and the two types of errors are not readily distinguishable in the data.  Returns were selected 
before mathematical and clerical errors were corrected as part of routine IRS processing.  Therefore simple 
computational errors are also counted as noncompliance in this study. 
 
8 The difference between the upper- and lower-bound estimates is attributable to alternative treatments of 
taxpayers who failed to appear for an audit.  Unless otherwise noted, the estimates in this paper are based 
on the upper-bound set of estimates and on the amount of overclaims prior to any IRS enforcement 
activities. 
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 About $1.7 billion in EITC overclaims occurred on returns with income reporting 
errors. Farm and non-farm business income – much of which is not reported 
independently to the IRS – accounted for 57 percent of the unreported income.   
The tiebreaker rule accounted for a substantial portion of EITC overclaims.  At 
the time of the study, only the taxpayer with the highest adjusted gross income could 
claim the child in an extended-family household.  The IRS study counted nearly $2 
billion of EITC claims by the lower-income taxpayers as errors, without any adjustment 
for the amount that should have been claimed by other adults in the household.  Since the 
study was conducted, the AGI tiebreaker was simplified, so that it now only applies when 
more than one taxpayer claims the same child.  Had this provision been in effect in 1999, 
about $1.4 billion of EITC overclaims would have been eliminated.  If in addition other 
simplification and enforcement provisions that were enacted in 2001 had been in effect in 
1999, EITC overclaims would have been reduced by roughly $2 billion (Holtzblatt and 
McCubbin, 2004). 
 
Comparing spending programs and refundable tax credits 
 Lacking data on overall taxpayer compliance, we cannot answer the critical 
question of how EITC error rates compare to compliance rates for the rest of the income 
tax.  Nor can we answer the fundamental question of whether the EITC causes 
noncompliance or if the noncompliance we observe among EITC claimants is 
symptomatic of more pervasive problems throughout the tax system.  The EITC error rate 
can (and is often) compared to noncompliance rates in means-tested programs 
administered by non-tax agencies.  This is a valid comparison, if the question is whether 
a benefit should be provided through the tax system or through an expenditure system.  
Even if the decision is to keep the credit in the tax system (because eligible individuals 
have little interaction with the agencies that run welfare programs), the comparison may 
shed light on whether there are better administrative practices that could be adopted by 
the IRS. 
 In past papers (2000, 2004), I have compared the EITC error rate to that of the 
food stamp program.  One of the reasons to compare the food stamp program to the EITC 
is that both – unlike many other programs targeted to low-income families -- are available 
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to people attached to the work force.  (Unlike the EITC, food stamp benefits are also 
available to non-workers.)   Both have similar targeting provisions.  As Table 6 shows, 
both programs have requirements regarding income, assets, household composition, and 
citizenship.  Food stamp benefits phase out at a steeper rate than the EITC, contributing 
to higher marginal tax rates (but over a shorter income range) than the tax credit.  
Despites these similarities (and differences), the food stamp overpayment error rate is 
substantially lower than that of the EITC:  6.16 percent (Rosenbaum, 2003).  One 
possible explanation for differences in the error rates is the dissimilarities in how the two 
benefits are administered.  Another reason may be differences in how compliance is 
measured in the two programs. 
 First, the food stamp application typically requires more information than the 
taxpayer is required to provide on a Schedule EIC.  In part, this is due to the fact that the 
taxpayer provides much of the necessary information elsewhere on the tax return.  The 
Schedule EIC asks only for information not available elsewhere on the tax return or 
through independent data sources:  the child’s name, social security number, and months 
of residency in the taxpayer’s home.  Food stamp applications vary by state, but typically 
require extensive information on income, assets, and household composition.  
 Second, the food stamp program is not a self-assessment program.  With few 
exceptions for the elderly and disabled, food stamp applicants are required to visit a state 
office to apply for benefits.  A personal interview with a state caseworker is required.  
Most state offices, however, are opened only during working hours, requiring applicants 
to take time off from their own jobs in order to apply for benefits. 
 A third difference between the two programs is the timing and source of third-
party verification.  Administrators in both programs recognize the need for third-party 
verification.  With the exception of the W-2 required from all filers with earnings, no 
documentation is required of EITC claimants at the time of application.  As discussed 
earlier, the IRS has developed several automated data systems that can be matched 
against tax returns during processing in order to identify questionable claims.  When 
anomalous EITC claims are detected, the taxpayer may be asked to supply documentation 
in support of their claim.  State food stamp programs typically require applicants to 
provide much more documentation at the time of application.  Massachusetts, for 
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example, requires documentation of identity, residence, utility bills, bank accounts, pay 
stubs, dependent care expenses, unearned income, self-employment income, rental 
income, medical expenses, etc. 
 Collecting this information is not without cost.  Combined federal and state 
administrative costs for the food stamp program are about $4 billion – roughly 40 percent 
of the IRS total budget for a program that serves far fewer units (about 9 million food 
stamp households compared to 130 million plus returns).  Food stamp participation rates 
are low, with less than half of eligible working households claiming the benefits to which 
they are entitled.   
  Finally, to some extent the comparison between the EITC and food stamp error 
rates can both understate and overstate the differences between the two programs.  While 
both error rates include erroneous payments in the numerator, the denominator for the 
EITC is the amount claimed while the denominator for food stamps is the amount paid.  
The EITC error rate would be larger if the denominator was the amount paid, while the 
food stamp error rate would be smaller if its denominator was the amount claimed. 
 On the other hand, the IRS may measure erroneous payments (the numerator) 
more stringently than is done in the food stamp program.  In the typical EITC compliance 
study, every aspect of EITC eligibility is scrutinized.   While no one would want to be the 
subject of a food stamp quality control study, USDA investigators may be less intense 
than their IRS counterparts.  Food stamp quality control manuals make no mention of 
investigating whether the household actually purchases and prepares meals together.  
(Some of the state food stamp manuals explicitly state that this is too difficult to 
measure.)  Since 2001, food stamp benefits are not affected by earnings fluctuations over 
six-month period.  To verify self-employment income, quality control examiners often 
rely on tax returns, which would be the beginning – not the end – of an IRS audit.  
Testimony of neighbors and friends is accepted in a food stamp interview, while IRS 
investigators may discount such information. 
 The food stamp program offers two lessons.  More up-front requirements may be 
a contributory factor in keeping error rates down, but they also increase administrative 
costs and may lower participation.  The other lesson is that some reasonable expectations 
about what can be administered can be built into compliance measures.  
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Part II.  British Tax-Transfer System 
 
Features of the British Income Tax-Transfer System 
 The British income tax system offers an interesting contrast to the U.S. income 
tax system.  It is an exact withholding system, in which Inland Revenue attempts to 
insure that the exact amount of tax liability is withheld so that taxpayers are not required 
to file returns at the end of the year to obtain refunds or to pay a balance due.  Exact 
withholding systems, like the United Kingdom, typically apply a PAYE (“pay-as-you-
earn”) tax withholding plan for wage income. 
 The British system illustrates the important relationship between tax structure and 
tax administration.  Key features of the British tax system include: 
• The unit of taxation is the individual. 
• There are only three statutory rates applicable to taxable income:  10 percent, 22 
percent, and 40 percent.  Eighty percent of taxpayers are taxed at the basic rate. 
• Separate rates apply to interest and dividend income, but taxes on these items are 
withheld at the source.   
• Some capital gains income is exempt from taxation. 
• The British system has fewer itemized deductions, and the manner in which 
taxpayers claim these deductions differs.  For example, taxpayers may reduce the 
amount of their payments to charitable organizations by the tax benefit, leaving it 
up to the charity to collect their donations from Inland Revenue.   
About two-thirds of British taxpayers are able to avoid filing tax returns.  Those who are 
required to file include taxpayers with significant amounts of asset income and/or capital 
gains.  Taxpayers with self-employment income are also required to file returns. 
 Relative to the U.S. income tax system, the British tax system does little to 
differentiate among taxpayers based on family needs.  Until recently, there were 
allowances for married individuals and single parents – similar in concept to our standard 
deductions for married couples and heads of households – but there was no differential 
rate treatment based on marital status or deductions and credits for children.9    
                                                 
9 Married couples were entitled to a “married couple” allowance.  In 1999, the amount was equal to 1,970 
pounds ($3,140) if both spouses are under 65.  For all eligible taxpayers, the value of the allowance is equal 
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 Instead, the British provided assistance to families with children, particularly low-
income working families, through the social security system.  Since 1977, the linchpin of 
this assistance network was the child benefit, available to all families with children, 
regardless of their income or assets.  The universal child benefit was supplemented by 
other assistance programs, including benefits for low-income working families.   In 1971 
(four years before the enactment in the United States of the EITC), the U.K. introduced 
the Family Income Supplement (FIS), which provided an earnings supplement for 
families with at least one full-time worker.   In 1988, the FIS was expanded and renamed 
the Family Credit (FC).   
 Since coming into office in 1997, the Blair Government has implemented major 
reforms to tax, transfer, and regulatory systems.  Many of these reforms were motivated 
by goals that should sound familiar to U.S. policymakers:  making work pay and helping 
families with children, particularly those most in need.  As part of these reforms, a 
minimum wage was implemented, and benefits for families with children – particularly 
low-wage workers -- were expanded.   Particularly noteworthy was the increasing 
reliance on the tax system to provide these benefits. The reforms to the tax system have 
occurred in two phases.  
 In the first phase, the Labour government shifted administrative responsibility for 
some assistance programs to Inland Revenue.  In 1999, the United Kingdom replaced the 
FC with the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC).  Like the FC, the WFTC is based on 
the couple’s combined earnings, the number of hours worked, and the number of children 
in the family.  By reducing the credit’s phase-out rate, more families became eligible for 
the WFTC.  And responsibility for the administration of the credit was shifted from the 
Department of Social Security to Inland Revenue.  WFTC claimants, however, were not 
required to file an end-of-year tax return. Instead, claimants were sent a form (similar to 
the application form that had been used for the FC) directly to Inland Revenue with 
information on family composition, family income, and assets.  Inland Revenue then 
instructed the worker’s employer to add the appropriate amount to the worker’s regular 
                                                                                                                                                 
to 10 percent of 1,970 pounds. The couple could elect to divide the married couple allowance between them 
equally or to allocate it wholly to either spouse.  Except for taxpayers aged 65 or older, the married couple 
allowance was repealed after April 2000.  Unmarried individuals who live with a child under age 18 were 
entitled to an additional personal allowance equal to the married couple allowance. This additional personal 
allowance was also repealed after April 2000. 
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pay check. Self-employed individuals received the credit directly from the Tax Credit 
Office.   
 Over the next several years, other tax credits were added to the British tax system.  
Notably, the allowances for married couples and single parents were repealed and 
replaced with a new nonrefundable Children’s Tax Credit in April 2001.  The Children’s 
Tax Credit was a nonrefundable credit equal to 520 pounds for each child under the age 
of 16.    
 The British experience in the first phase of reform made their tax system 
increasingly like the U.S.  Targeted tax credits were available to families with children 
that depended, to some degree, on the combined income of the child’s parents.  And like 
the U.S. experience, the British tax credits based eligibility on similar, but subtly 
different, criteria.   As Table 6   demonstrates, the two credits had different definitions of 
children and income.       
 Even as the children’s tax credit was being implemented, the British government 
was laying the groundwork for the next phase of reforms.   In 2000, the U.K. Treasury 
Department announced that further reform was necessitated by the earlier reforms.  
According to the British Treasury: 
Using one system to achieve two objectives – in the case of the Working 
Families’ Tax Credit, better work incentives and increased family support – can 
give rise to tensions.  At the same time, using several different instruments to 
contribute towards a single goal – increased family support in Income Support, 
the Working Families Tax Credit and the Children’s Tax Credit can mean a 
duplication of effort (2000, pg. 22). 
 
Thus, the British proposed to separate the child support and work incentives functions of 
the various tax credits.  In April 2003, the WFTC, disabled person’s tax credit, and 
children tax credit were replaced by two credits:  the Child Tax Credit and the Working 
Tax Credit.  Both are refundable tax credits and use the same definition and unit of 
income.  Neither credit has an assets test.  However, eligibility for the Child Tax Credit 
does not depend on work status, and eligibility for the WTC is not limited to workers 
with children.   Table 7 describes the eligibility criteria for the CTC and WTC.  
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 While the CTC is available to nonworkers and the WTC is available only to 
workers (including those without children), a common application is used to apply for 
either credit.  The individual (and his or her partner) must provide address, date of birth, 
and national insurance number, as well as their children’s names and the family’s child 
benefit reference number.  The application also asks about child care expenses, hours 
worked, and income.  So, in many respects, the credit application looks like a U.S. 
income tax return.  But after the first year, the applicant does not need to complete 
another application.  He or she can look at their record on-line and notify Inland Revenue 
of any changes in family and financial circumstances. 
 The other difference is the payment method.  The credits are not paid in one lump 
sum.  Rather, they are paid in weekly or monthly increments throughout the year.  The 
WTC is paid through the employer (who subtracts credit payments from tax payments), 
while the child tax credit is paid to a bank or building society account.  Further, the 
credits are effectively paid in advance and based on prior year’s income.  Should there be 
a change in circumstances (including an increase of income in excess of 2,500 pounds), 
credit recipients may have to repay the excess to Inland Revenue at the end of the year.  
 The second phase of reform was marked by two other shifts in administrative 
responsibilities.  First, the consolidation of child-related benefits does not end at the tax 
system.  When fully implemented this year, the child tax credit will also include amounts 
for children previously paid in Income Support (including the Minimum Income 
Guarantee) and income-based Jobseeker's Allowance.  This change – combined with the 
fact that the refundable child tax credit is not tied to earnings – means that individuals 
who typically do not have contact with Inland Revenue are being brought into the tax 
system solely to obtain refundable tax credits.  The initial plan is to have information 
collected by the agencies that these individuals would typically deal with.  The 
information would then be forwarded to Inland Revenue, who would then dispense 
checks to the eligible individuals.   
 The second event was that administration of the universal Child Benefit was 
shifted from the Social Security administration to Inland Revenue.  However, the Child 
Benefit has not been reclassified as a tax credit.   The application process for the Child 
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Benefit remains separate from that of the targeted Child Tax Credit.  To apply for the 
Child Benefit, applicants must provide the child’s birth or adoption certificate. 
 
Arguments for and against using the British tax system to deliver targeted benefits   
 Reforms since 1997 have made the British tax system – at least with respect to 
working families and children – look more like the U.S. income tax system.  However, 
there is a key difference between the two countries because most EITC claimants are 
required to file a tax return, while most U.K. tax credits recipients are not.  In the United 
Kingdom, the working parent had contact with both Department of Social Security (in 
order to apply for the non-means tested child benefit) and Inland Revenue (to supply 
information necessary to determine the correct PAYE rate), but he or she would not 
normally provide either agency with all of the information (such as total family income or 
assets) necessary to determine eligibility for the CTC if the credit did not exist.  Thus, a 
major advantage of administering subsidies through the tax system -- an application for 
benefits that follows directly from an activity that the worker must undertake anyway -- is 
not present in the U.K. system.   
 In both the first and second phases of reform, the Labour government has offered 
several reasons for using the tax system to deliver targeted benefits.  One argument is that 
shifting the FC (and later other expenditure programs) into the tax system would allow 
for better integration of the tax and transfer system by simplifying and streamlining the 
administration of various programs.  Closer coordination of tax and transfer policies 
would also focus attention on  high marginal tax rates; in both phases, reforms have been 
accompanied with expansions of assistance to families, thus reducing the marginal tax 
rates on lower income families (while increasing them on families higher up the income 
scale who previously were ineligible for such benefits).  (Taylor, 1998, U.K. HM 
Treasury, 2000, Brewer et al, 2001, Brewer et al, 2003)  Further, with the most recent 
consolidation of credits, the patchwork of eligibility rules that characterized the first 
phase has been replaced with simpler uniform rules.  These arguments make a compelling 
case for consolidation of assistance programs, but they could support placement of the 
new credits in either the tax or transfer system.   
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 There are several other arguments – some made by the Labour government, some 
not – in support of using the system to provide targeted assistance.  First, payment of the 
WTC builds on the PAYE system, in which taxes are withheld by the employer.  The 
WTC operates as a reverse-PAYE in a manner similar to the EITC advance payment 
option.  As with the advance payment option, the worker must repay any amount that is 
overpaid during the year, but the British limit the risk of repayments by ignoring income 
fluctuations less than 2,500 pounds.   Paying the credit through the paycheck was viewed 
as important to reinforce the distinction between the “rewards of work and remaining on 
welfare” (Taylor, 1998). 
 A second consideration was stigma.   Administering benefits through the tax 
system, rather than the welfare system, was expected to reduce the stigma associated with 
claiming the FC and thus lead to an increase in program participation.   From an 
outsider’s perspective, the amount of attention paid to stigma concerns in the United 
Kingdom is interesting.  The application process for the FC was not very different from 
that now being used for the WTC and child tax credit.  Unlike U.S. transfer programs run 
by welfare agencies, low-income families did not have to go to a state office to apply for 
the FC but instead could deal with the Department of Social Security through the mail.   
 The evidence is mixed as to whether the shift to the tax system has reduce stigma 
and increased participation among those eligible for the credits.  In 2000-01, 62 to 65 
percent of eligible families received the WFTC.  In contrast, about 66 to 70 percent of 
families eligible for the FC received it in 1998-99 – the last year of the FC’s existence.  
However, among WFTC recipients who would have been eligible for FC under its more 
restrictive income requirements, participation rates were higher – about 75 to 81 percent 
of those eligible for WFTC received it. (U.K. Inland Revenue, 2002) The higher 
participation rates among those who were eligible under both credits might be attributable 
to a reduction in stigma – but it also might result from the increased credit amounts. 
 A tax credit was thought to be politically more acceptable than social security 
benefits to most claimants and taxpayers as a whole.  The Taylor report concluded that 
operating the FC through the tax system “would ensure greater acceptability to both the 
claimants and taxpayers.”   The report went on to note, “It is noticeable that the US 
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Administration has secured widespread political support for the EITC at a time when the 
US welfare budget more generally has been under remorseless attack.” 
 There is one argument that could have been made in defense of the shifting 
responsibilities, but is not.  Inland Revenue is presumably in a better position to verify 
eligibility for targeted benefits because of the amount of information on income reported 
to Inland Revenue in an exact withholding system.  What was lacking in the British 
system (as in the U.S. income tax system) was independent information on family 
relationships.  This shortfall was partly rectified by the transfer of administration of child 
benefit to Inland Revenue.  With this new responsibility presumably came access to data 
file containing names of parents linked to their children and authenticated by receipt, at 
application, with the child’s birth or adoption certificate.  Because applicants for the 
Child Tax Credit must provide both their National Insurance number and a child benefit 
reference number, Inland Revenue has the capability to link data from the two programs 
in order to verify claims.  In effect, Inland Revenue – through the universal Child Benefit 
– gained access to the counterpart of Kidlink in the United States, without having to wait 
a generation for the completion of the file.  From an organizational perspective, it may 
have be easier to shift the existing files on children and parents to Inland Revenue rather 
than to provide the Department of Social Security with all the income information 
collected in the tax system.  The British experience also raises the question of whether a 
universal benefit may be a way to obtain data that would not be otherwise easily 
accessible and which can be used to help target other benefits. 
 
Part III.  Conclusions 
 
 Providing targeted assistance to low-income individuals through the income tax 
system may be appropriate under certain circumstances.  Under the current tax system in 
the United States, many low-income working individuals would file income tax returns 
even if there were no refundable tax credits.  Information on their earnings and other 
income is regularly reported to the IRS.  Many of them are either ineligible for needs-
based benefits provided by other agencies, or they choose – either because of high 
transactions costs or concerns with stigma – not to claim those benefits.  Thus, for low-
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income working individuals, the point of contact with the federal government is often the 
IRS.    
 The experience of Great Britain demonstrates that even when these conditions do 
not hold, policymakers may still find it advantageous to use the tax system as a delivery 
mechanism.  One argument, stated by politicians in the U.K., is political:  they (and 
possibly their U.S. counterparts) find that providing benefits through the tax system is 
more acceptable than expanding spending programs.  But the British experience suggests 
that there may be other considerations.  The British, for example, use their exact 
withholding system in reverse to pay work-related tax credits to workers in a timely 
fashion.  Concern that the stigma of applying for benefits through a “welfare” agency 
may cut participation also motivates interest in using the tax system.  And possibly the 
most obvious argument in support of using the tax system to provide targeted benefits is 
the one seldom mentioned:  the income tax system in the United Kingdom, as in the 
United States, has the best access to information on income. 
 Yet as the U.S. experience demonstrates, operating targeted benefit programs 
through the tax system is fraught with difficulties.  Key among them is the fact that the 
tax system lacks complete data on family composition and needs.  Limited resources, 
relative to other priorities, may limit the IRS’s ability to prevent payments of 
questionable claims.   As a result, noncompliance may be higher than in spending 
programs that rely on more labor-intensive (and more expensive) enforcement 
techniques. 
 Reducing noncompliance among EITC claimants remains one of the biggest 
challenges for the IRS.  This year, the IRS is piloting a small program in which 25,000 
EITC claimants were asked to provide documentation at the time they filed their tax 
return demonstrating that they resided with their qualifying children for the required 
length of time.   Without ceding control of the tax credit, the IRS is instead testing the 
adoption of one of the practices used commonly by other agencies in the administration 
of targeted benefits.  This pilot will be carefully evaluated, to determine the effect of the 
additional documentation requirement on both compliance and participation. 
 The British experience also suggests that much simplification can be achieved by 
consolidating assistance programs.  In the United States, several analysts have suggested 
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that child-related tax benefits could be consolidated into one tax credit (Ellwood and 
Liebman, 2001, Sawicky and Cherry, 2001, Carasso, Rohaly, and Steuerle, 2003).  In 
recent years, the Department of the Treasury has made a number of proposals that would 
simplify the current targeting rules for the EITC and the additional child tax credit.  Some 
of these proposals conform the eligibility rules for the EITC and the additional child tax 
credit more closely: by, for example, defining a child and earned income in the same way 
and by eliminating the EITC investment test.  These proposals also lay the groundwork to 
someday consider the consolidation of the two credits.  
Trade-offs Between Targeting and Simplicity: Lessons from 





Brewer, Mike (2003).  “The New Tax Credits,”  Institute for Fiscal Studies, Briefing 
Note No. 35. 
 
Brewer, Mike, Maria Jose Suarez, and Ian Walker.  Modelling take-up of Family Credit 
and Working Families’ Tax Credit.   www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/reserach/ifs-takeup.pdf. 
 
Brewer, Mike, Tom Clark, and Michal Myck (2001).  “Credit Where It’s Due?  An 
Assessment of the New Tax Credits,”  Institute for Fiscal Studies.  Commentary 86, 
October. 
 
Barrow, Lisa and Leslie McGranahan (2001).  “The Effects of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit on the Seasonality of Household Expenditures,” ed. by Bruce Meyer and Douglas 
Holtz-Eakin, Making Work Pay, Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Carasso, Adam, Jeff Roahly, and C. Eugene Steuerle (2003).  Tax Reform for Families:  
An Earned Income Child Credit.  The Brookings Institution Policy Brief:  Welfare 
Reform & Beyond #26, July. 
 
Cunnyngham, Karen (2003).  “Trends in Food Stamp Participation Rates:  1994 to 2001.”  
Report submitted to U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Services.  
Washington, D.C.:  Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., July. 
 
Dickert, Stacy, Scott Hauser, and John Karl Scholz (1995).  “The Earned Income Tax 
Credit and Transfer Programs:  A Study of Labor Market and Program Participation.”  
Tax Policy and the Economy No. 9, MIT Press:  Cambridge, 1995 
 
Eissa, Nada and Jeffrey Liebman (1996).  “Labor Supply Response and the Earned 
Income Tax Credit.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(2). 
 
Elwood, David T. and Jeffrey B. Liebman (2001).  “The Middle Class Parent Penalty:  
Child Benefits in the U.S. Tax Code,”  Tax Policy and the Economy, MIT Press, Vol. 15. 
 
Holtzblatt, Janet (2000).  “Choosing Between Refundable Tax Credits and Spending 
Programs.”  Proceedings of the 93rd Annual Conference on Taxation.  Washington D.C.:  
National Tax Association. 
 
Holtzblatt, Janet and Jeffrey L. Liebman (1999).  “The Earned Income Tax Credit 
Abroad:  Implications of the British Working Families Tax Credit for Pay-As-You-Earn 
Administration.”  Proceedings of the Ninety-First Annual Conference on Taxation.  
Washington, D.C.:  National Tax Association. 
 
Holtzblatt, Janet and Janet McCubbin (2004, forthcoming).  “Issues Affecting Low-
Income Filers” in The Crisis in Tax Administration, ed. by Henry Aaron and Joel 
Slemrod, Washington, D.C.:  Brookings Institution Press.   
International Studies Program Public Finance Conference 
The Challenges of Tax Reform in a Global Economy 
28 
 
Holtzblatt, Janet and Janet McCubbin (2003).  “Whose Child is It Anyway?  Simplifying 
the Definition of a Child” in National Tax Journal LVI(3), September. 
 
Liebman, Jeffrey (1997).  ALessons from Tax-Benefit Integration from the U.S. Earned 
Income Tax Credit Experience.@  York:  Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
 
Meyer, Bruce and Dan Rosenbaum (2001).  “Making Single Mothers Work:  Recent Tax 
and Welfare Policy and It’s Effects,” ed. by Bruce Meyer and Douglas Holtz-Eakin, 
Making Work Pay, Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Ponza, Michael, James C. Ohls, Lorenzo Moreno, Amy Zambrowski, and Rhonda Cohen 
(1999). “Customer Service in the Food Stamp Program.”  Report submitted to U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Services.  Washington, D.C.:  
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., July. 
 
Rosenbaum, Dottie (2003).  Food Stamp Overpayment Error Rate Hits Record Low.  
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, July. 
 
Romich, Jennifer L. and Thomas S. Weisner (2001).  “How Families View and Use the 
Earned Income Tax Credit:  Advance Payment Versus Lump-Sum Delivery” ed. by 
Bruce Meyer and Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Making Work Pay, Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Sawicky, Max C. and Robert Cherry (2001).  Making Work Pay With Tax Reform.  
Economic Policy Institute, Issue Brief #172.  December. 
 
Scholz, John Karl (1994).  “The Earned Income Tax Credit:  Participation, Compliance, 
and Antipoverty Effectiveness,” National Tax Journal 47(1): 63-85. 
 
Smeeding, Timothy, Katherin Ross Phillips, and Michael A. O’Connor (2001).  “The 
Earned Income Tax Credit:  Expectation, Knowledge, Use, and Economic and Social 
Mobility,” ed. by Bruce Meyer and Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Making Work Pay, Russell 
Sage Foundation. 
 
Taylor, Martin (1998).  Work Incentives.  A Report to HM Treasury.  London. 
 
U.K. Inland Revenue, Analysis and Research (2002).  Working Families’ Tax Credit:  
Estimates of Take-up Rates in 2000-01.   
 
U.K. HM Treasury (2000).  Tackling Poverty and Making Work Pay – Tax Credits for the 
21st Century, March. 
 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (1999).  Advance Earned 
Income Tax Credit:  1994 and 1997 Notice Study, August. 
 
Trade-offs Between Targeting and Simplicity: Lessons from 
 the U.S. and British Experiences with Refundable Tax Credits 
 
29
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (2002a).  Compliance 
Estimates for Earned Income Tax Credit Claimed on 1999 Returns, February 28. 
 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (2002b).  Participation in the 
Earned Income Tax Credit Program for Tax Year 1996, January 31. 
 
U.S. Department of the Treasury (2003).  Report to the Congress on Return-Free Tax 
Systems:  Tax Simplification Is a Prerequisite, December. 
 
U.S. General Accounting Office (1992).  Earned Income Tax Credit:  Advance Payment 
Option Is Not Widely Known or Understood by the Public.  GAO/GGD-92-26.  February. 
 
U.S. General Accounting Office (1999).  Food Stamp Program:  Various Factors Have 
Led to Declining Participation.  GAO/RCED-99-185.  July. 
 
U.S. General Accounting Office (2001).  Earned Income Tax Credit Eligibility and 
Participation. GAO-02-0290R, Washington, DC, December 14.
 
International Studies Program Public Finance Conference 
The Challenges of Tax Reform in a Global Economy 
30 
Table 1
Costs of Refundable Tax Credits
Millions
Fiscal Years
Tax Credit 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
  Receipts 5,099         4,884         5,006         5,477         5,515         5,603         5,780         
  Outlays 31,961       33,551       34,148       34,488       34,388       34,539       35,161       
     Total 37,060       38,435       39,154       39,965       39,903       40,142       40,941       
Child Tax Credit
  Receipts 37,970       24,340       29,860       24,810       24,680       24,480       25,430       
  Outlays (Additional Child Tax Credit) 6,435         7,447         11,486       8,440         8,237         7,956         7,909         
    Total 44,405       31,787       41,346       33,250       32,917       32,436       33,339       
Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC)
  Receipts -             50              60              60              70              70              80              
  Outlays -             60              90              100            120            130            140            
    Total -             110            150            160            190            200            220            
Source:  U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2004).  Table 18-2.  
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Figure 1: Filing and Tax Thresholds Relative to Poverty Threshold
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Table 3
Overlap Between EITC and Transfer System in 2000
Transfer % of EITC-Eligible Filing Units
Reporting Receipt of Transfers
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 5
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 3
Food Stamps 16
Medicaid 17
Any of Above 24
Source:  Author's calculations based on March 2001 Current Population Survey.  
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Comparison of EITC and Additional Child Tax Credit in 2004 
Eligibility Criteria EITC Additional Child Tax 
Credit 
Income Tests   
1.  Earnings Yes Yes 
       Minimum amount No minimum  Greater than $10,750 
       Maximum amount  $35,458  (if married with 
two children) 
No maximum  
       Definition Sum of wages, salaries, tips, 
other taxable employee 
compensation, self-
employment income 
Same as EITC except 
earned income must be 
included in computing 
taxable income 
2.  Adjusted gross income Yes Yes 
        Maximum amount  $35,458  (if married with 
two children) 
$150,000 (if married with 
two children) 
        Definition Same as AGI for regular tax Modified to include 
amounts earned abroad or in 
certain possession. 
3.  Investment income Yes No 
        Maximum amount $2,650 N.A. 
        Definition Sum of interest (including 
tax-exempt), dividends, 
capital gains, rents, 
royalties, and certain 
passive income 
N.A. 
    Family Status   
1.  Children Affects size of credit Must have to qualify 
        Number Two No limit 
        Age Under 19 
Under 24 if full-time 
student 
No age-cut if disabled 
Under 17 
        Relationship Son, daughter, grandchild 
Sibling, niece or nephew if 
cared for as if taxpayer’s 
own 
Foster child if cared for as if 
taxpayer’s own 
Same as EITC 
        Residency More than six months Residency test applies only 
to foster children, who must 
reside with taxpayer for 12 
months 
        Support No support requirement. Must provide over half 
child’s support 
2.  Marital status   
        Unmarried Yes Yes 
         Married Must file jointly No restrictions 
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Table 5




Error ($ in millions)1
Family Issues
Qualifying Child 3,284            
  Residency 2,698            
  Relationship 1,447            
  SSN Not Valid for Employment 421               
  Age 206               
Filing Status 2,724            
AGI Tiebreaker 1,984            
Income 1,710            
Underreported Income 1,494            
  Business Income 854               
  Other Income 640               
Earned Income Overreported 171               
Income Recategorized (Total Unchanged) 45                 
Other Errors 437               
Errors Corrected in Processing 939               
Did Not Appear for Audit 2,226            
  Total 11,118          
Source:  Holtzblat and McCubbin, 2004.
1   Sum of this column exceeds total because
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Comparison of EITC and Food Stamps in 2004 
Eligibility Criteria 
Income and Asset Tests 
EITC Food Stamps 
1.  Earnings Yes No 
       Minimum amount No minimum  No minimum 
       Maximum amount  $35,458  (if married with 
two children) 
Benefits reduced by 30% of 
earnings 
       Definition Sum of wages, salaries, tips, 




2.  Gross income Yes Yes 
        Maximum amount  $35,458  (if married with 
two children) 
$23,928 (for a family of 
four) 
        Definition Adjusted gross income Sum of  
3.  Investment  Income test Asset test 
        Maximum amount $2,650 $2,000 ($3,000 if elderly) 
        Definition Sum of interest (including 
tax-exempt), dividends, 
capital gains, rents, 
royalties, and certain 
passive income 
Sum of cash on hand, bank 
accounts, stocks, bonds, 
IRA and Keogh plans.  
Some less liquid assets 
(autos) counted. 
Household composition None Prepare and purchase 
meals together. 
1.  Children Affects size of credit Affects size of benefits 
        Number Two No limit 
        Age Under 19 
Under 24 if full-time 
student 
No age-cut if disabled 
Under 18 or 21 if 
applicant’s child 
        Relationship Son, daughter, grandchild 
Sibling, niece or nephew if 
cared for as if taxpayer’s 
own 
Foster child if cared for as if 
taxpayer’s own 
Minors in parental care 
under 18 
Own child if under 21 
        Residency More than six months Part of household unit while 
benefits are paid 
        Support No support requirement. No support requirement 
2.  Marital status   
        Unmarried Yes Yes 
         Married Must file jointly No restrictions 
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Eligibility Criteria WFTC Children’s Tax Credit 
Refundable Yes No 
Income and Asset Tests   
1.  Earnings Yes No 
       Minimum amount No minimum but must work 
at least 16 hours a week 
Not applicable 
       Definition Sum of wages, salaries, tips, 
housing allowances, self-
employment income.  Net 
of taxes (including 
children’s tax credit), 
National Insurance 
contributions, and one-half 
pension contributions.  
Not applicable 
2.  Income Yes Yes 
        Definition Couple’s combined cash 
income after taxes. 
Gross income.  Phases out 
on higher earner’s income if 
he or she is in higher tax 
rate bracket 
3.  Assets Yes No 
        Maximum amount 8,000 pounds Not applicable 
   Family Status   
1.  Children Must have to qualify Must have to qualify 
        Number No limit No limit  
        Age Under 16 (when) 
Under 19 if full-time 
student 
Under 16 at start of tax year 
        Relationship Not applicable. Own child (including 
adopted and step) or a child 
supported by taxpayer 
        Residency Child must reside with 
claimant as member of 
family.  
Child must live with 
taxpayer for some part of 
tax year. 
        Support No support requirement. Applicable if child is not 
taxpayer’s own 
2.  Marital status   
        Unmarried If living alone, file 
separately; if cohabiting 
with partner, file jointly. 
Same as WFTC 
         Married Must file jointly Same as WFTC 
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Description of Child and Working Tax Credits 
Common eligibility rules 
1.  Claimant must be at least 16 years old and normally living in the United Kingdom. 
2.  Eligibility is based on gross income.  If the individual is married or cohabiting, then 
eligibility is based on the couple’s gross income. 
3.  Credits are initially based on prior year’s income.  If income during tax year exceeds 
prior year’s income by £2,500, the recipient will have to repay a portion or all of the 
credit. 
 
Child Tax Credit 
Who is eligible? To be eligible for the child tax credit, an individual (or the couple, if 
married or cohabiting) must be responsible for one or more qualifying children.  In 2003-
04, eligibility extended to families with incomes of to £58,000 a year.   
Definition of child.  Children must be under the age of 16 or 19 if a full-time student.  
The applicant must be responsible for the child.  Deciding who has the main 
responsibility for the child is based on facts and circumstances, such as the child’s 
residency with the applicant. 
Amount of credit.  The child tax credit consists of two basic components:  the family 
element (one per family) and the child element (one per each child).  In 2003-04, the 
maximum amounts of the family and child elements were, respectively, £545 per family 
and £1,445 per child.  The family element is doubled for families with children under the 
age of one.  There are also supplements to the child element for disabled children. 
Phase-out.  In 2003-04, families with annual gross income below £13,230 were entitled 
to the full credit.  The child elements were phased-out for incomes above £13,230, so that 
a family with one child and £17,135 would receive only the family element.  The family 
element is phase-out between £50,000 and £58,134 (£66,269 if the family has a child 
under the age of one). 
 
Working Tax Credit 
Who is eligible?  Working Tax Credit is for people who are employed or self-employed 
(either on their own or in partnerships), who usually work 16 hours or more a week, are 
paid for that work, and expect to work for at least 4 weeks.  Applicants must work at least 
16 hours a week.  Applicants must be at least 16 years old and either is responsible for at 
least one child or is disabled.  Able-bodied workers without children are eligible if they 
are at least 25 years old and work a minimum of 30 hours a week. 
Amount of credit:   In 2003-04, the maximum credit was £1,525 for unmarried 
individuals without children and £3,025 for couples (with or without children) and single 
parents.  Workers with children who work 30 or more hours a week were entitled to an 
additional £620.  There were also supplemental amounts for if workers incurred child 
care expenses, were disabled, or were over 50 and reentrants into the workforce. 
Phase-out.  Applicants with annual gross income below £5,060 were entitled to the full 
amount.  As income exceeds £5,060, the credit is phased-out.  The credit was reduced to 
zero at £10,857 for single workers without children and income about £10,857, at 
£13,237 for part-time workers with children, and £14,911 for full-time workers with 
children. 
